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Abstract 
  
Previous research finds that customer racial discrimination decreases the price of 
a non-white baseball player’s card but does not decrease the price of a non-white 
basketball player’s card. This paper seeks to examine if racial minority or league minority 
affects the value of a trading card. Using disaggregated player performance data from 
1977 we explore this question with baseball cards (in which non-white players are the 
league minority) and basketball cards (in which white non-players are the league 
majority). Using Tobit regressions, we find that customer discrimination exists against 
non-white players in both baseball and basketball leagues.  
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I.  Introduction 
  
 In an attempt to identify the roots of economic inequality in American society, 
many economists have turned their attention to racial discrimination.  Becker (1971) 
defines discrimination in the market place as  “voluntary relinquishing of profits, wages, 
or income in order to cater to prejudice.”  He cites three sources of discrimination: 
employers, co-workers, and consumers.  According to Arrow (1972), natural economic 
forces within a competitive market reduce, if not eliminate, employer and co-worker 
discrimination.  Employer discrimination forces employees seeking fair business 
practices to relocate while co-worker discrimination causes self-sorting among workers in 
a mobile economic environment.  Therefore, if an economic imbalance exists between 
races, it comes as a consequence of consumer discrimination.  However, the task of 
measuring consumer discrimination is not a simple one.  The lack of a means to quantify 
and measure a worker’s ability in most labor markets presents a formidable obstacle to 
economists.  The professional sports labor market is a crucial exception to this standard. 
 Unlike other labor markets, where employee productivity is often blurred by 
extraneous variables, the professional sports labor market provides an isolated working 
arena in which uninhibited competition can take place.  Thus, every worker’s 
performance is a measure of individual ability, rather than a combination of skills and 
externalities.1  Such a distinction is necessary when analyzing consumer discrimination. 
Take, for example, the case of two competing door-to-door salesmen.  Both sales 
representatives are selling the same product, at the same exact price, in the same local 
area, at the same time.  The only difference between the two salesmen is their race.  After 
                                                 
1  Here the term “externalities” is taken to mean any factor, which may affect the productivity of a worker, 
including job experience, age, sex, and education, among others. 
 3 
 
http://GLJLWDOFRPPRQVLZXHGXXDXMH 
 
a given period of time, one salesman sells more items than the other one.  Is this because 
one sales representative has more experience than the other?  Is this because one 
salesman is a better speaker than the other?  Or, is one of the salesmen getting more sales 
because the consumer is racially discriminating against the other?  None of these 
questions can be answered in a market open to externalities.  However, in a relatively 
confined market, such as the sports labor market, consumer discrimination is identifiable 
because all extraneous factors can be controlled.   
Professional sport trading cards, in particular, provide an ideal means of tracing 
consumer discrimination.  The price of each card is derived from the entertainment value 
of the player represented on the card.  Accordingly, the better a player’s ability, the more 
entertainment they bring to the fans that in turn pay more for their card.  Each player’s 
ability is quantified in the form of disaggregated statistics, which appear on the back of 
each card.  By analyzing the relative price a card sells for in the secondary market with 
respect to a player’s race, one can show whether the price a consumer is willing to pay 
for a card is affected by the player’s race. 
This paper extends previous works but examines whether or not league status, 
more so than race, is the underlying variable influencing the price of a trading card. This 
paper seeks to answer whether card value is affected by the race of the player, or whether 
it is an issue of league minority.  This paper uses two Tobit regression models: one for 
Major League Baseball (MLB), where non-white players are the league minority, and one 
for the National Basketball Association (NBA), where non-white players are the league 
majority.  Therefore, the NBA provides a counterexample to the commonly studied MLB 
model, which may attribute lower minority prices to non-white players rather than league 
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minority.  The results of the regression models show that race impacts the trading price 
rather than league minority. That is, in both the MLB and the NBA non-white players’ 
cards have significantly lower prices. 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section II discusses the literature on the subject. 
Section III describes the data and methods. Section IV describes the specifications of the 
model. Section V presents the results. Section VI draws conclusions. 
II.  Literature 
Previous research concerning consumer racial discrimination in the professional 
baseball memorabilia market has suggested that a player’s race affects the value of their 
trading card.  Nardinelli and Simon (1990) construct a model using the 1970 Topps 
Baseball Card Series as their dataset for players.  Using player statistics from the 
Macmillan Baseball Encyclopedia and using Beckett’s Official 1989 Price Guide to 
Baseball Cards, they determine card value.  The results indicate that customer racial 
discrimination decreases a nonwhite baseball player’s card value by approximately ten 
percent with respect to a comparable white player’s card. 
 Anderson and La Croix (1991) extend Nardinelli and Simon by examining 
baseball card data from 1977, rather than 1970 because the 1977 data has no supply 
differences in the amount of baseball cards produced per player.  That is, each player has 
the same number of cards printed in that year.  Additionally, rather than use 
disaggregated player performance data for hitters, Anderson and La Croix employ player 
performance indices.  For hitters (non-pitchers) the performance index is measured as 
offensive average, which takes into account power, base hit frequency, and the effects of 
walks and stolen bases.  A pitcher’s performance index is based on two factors: earned 
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run average (ERA) and the ratio of strikeouts to walks, both of which are independent of 
a player’s team performance.  The results of Anderson and La Croix’s paper reinforce the 
conclusion of Nardinelli and Simon: customer discrimination exists against black hitters 
and pitchers.   
 Gabriel, Johnson, and Stanton (1995) investigate customer racial discrimination 
using rookie baseball cards for players entering major league baseball from 1984 to 1990. 
They examine if price is explained by expected future performance, as well as past 
performance and race. They find that price differences are not significantly influenced by 
race, contrasting the results found by Nardinelli and Simon (1990) and Andersen and La 
Croix (1991). Several factors may explain the difference in their results from those in 
previous studies. By using cards from active rookie players, racial discrimination may 
exist in both the current value of the card and the expectations about the future 
performance of a player. In addition, market segmentation in the baseball card market 
may occur such that those purchasing from the retired player’s baseball card market 
(middle-aged white males) may have different racial preferences than those purchasing 
from the current card market (younger adults and children). 
 Brown and Jewell (1994) examine customer discrimination in college basketball. 
They find that customer discrimination affects the revenue-earning potential of white 
players relative to black players. Therefore, they conclude that college programs wish to 
discriminate against black recruits. Customer racial discrimination has also been explored 
in the basketball market through Trading Cards and Neilson Ratings. Using active players 
during the 1976-1977 season Stone and Warren (1999) use maximum-likelihood 
estimation to explore price discrimination in basketball trading cards taking into 
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consideration position, years, and race. Overall they find no evidence of customer 
discrimination against black players. Using Neilson ratings, Kanazawa and Funk (2001) 
find that viewership increases when a higher percentage of white players are playing in a 
professional basketball game.  Thus, explaining the salary gap in basketball as race-
based.  
III. Data and Methods 
 This paper extends the model of Nardinelli and Simon (1990) by using 
disaggregated player performance data.  Furthermore, the same set of data as Anderson 
and La Croix (1991), 1977 Topps baseball cards, is used because of the uniform supply 
of cards.    The paper differs from Stone and Warren (1999) in that only basketball cards 
issued in 1977 are used and that performance statistics are included in the regression 
models. The inclusion of both baseball and basketball cards allows determinations of 
whether racial minority or league minority determine card value, based on the fact that 
non-white players are a minority in baseball and white players are a minority in 
basketball.   
Beckett’s Price Guide determines the price data and RealLegends.com determines 
data on race.2  In addition, each player’s career statistics are gathered from various 
sources, including the CNN/Sports Illustrated archives and a downloadable sports 
database program. 
 Each year, when a new set of cards is released, professional sport card 
manufacturers insert unique groups of cards known as “subsets.”  These cards differ from 
the others in their appearance, their title, and the fact that they can depict multiple players 
                                                 
2 RealLegends.com is an online website dedicated to tracking the market for professional sports 
memorabilia.  The site houses complete checklists of all professional sport card sets and pictures of each 
individual card. 
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on one card.  Every card manufacturer prints its own type of subset.  In 1990, for 
example, Topps inserted a subset entitled “Record Breakers” while Fleer and Donruss 
included “Players of the Decade” and “Diamond Kings,” respectively.  Although these 
cards are considered part of the complete set, they present a problem when trying to 
collect a uniform dataset because they repeat players who already appear in the main set 
of cards. 
The data include the 1977 set of Topps baseball cards, a total of 660 different 
cards.  Of these, 314 cards are omitted.  The majority of these cards fall into various 
subsets, including “Turn Back the Clock”, “League Leaders”, and “Big League 
Brothers”.  Team, coach, and manager cards are also left out along with the five checklist 
cards and the two world-series cards.  Likewise, for the 1977 set of Topps basketball 
cards, 11 cards are omitted from the 144 card set.  The omitted cards fall into the “All-
Star” subset and the one checklist card. 
With the remaining data, histograms are used to gain a better understanding of the 
price distribution of each card set with respect to a player’s race.  Figures 1 and 2 show 
the percentage of cards for white and non-white baseball non-pitchers and pitchers in 
specified price bins, while Figure 3 shows similar information for basketball players.  
Figures 1 – 3 show that in both sports, non-white players represent a substantial portion 
of the higher price cards.  This is important because it suggests that any one card does not 
bias the results in favor of one race.  Therefore, any conclusions reached as to the effect 
of race are a result of comparing cards of similar value.3 
                                                 
3 The Tobit regression results are robust when price outliers are omitted. 
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To analyze the effect race and league percentage have on card value, Tobit 
regressions are run on the two different sports cards.  For each set of cards there is a 
common card price representing the minimum observed value in the sample. This leads to 
the idea of a “common player” price.  As described by Nardinelli and Simon (1991), the 
price of a common player’s card is the absolute minimum value a card can take and is 
completely unrelated to the player performance.  As illustrated in Tables 1 - 3, the 
descriptive statistic tables for baseball non-pitchers, baseball pitchers, and basketball 
players, respectively, the common player price for 1977 Topps baseball cards (both non-
pitchers and pitchers) is $0.30 while the minimum value for a 1977 Topps basketball card 
is $1.75.  Several reasons exist for the variation between the baseball and basketball card 
minimum values.  First, there are fewer cards in the 1977 basketball set, 144 cards 
compared to 660.  Furthermore, Topps began making baseball cards in 1952, but did not 
start making basketball cards until the 1957 - 1958 basketball season.  As a result, 
basketball cards are harder to come by than baseball cards for this time period.  
Therefore, Tobit regressions are used to generate unbiased regression estimates. 
For both leagues (MLB and the NBA), the price of the card is the dependent variable, 
while performance statistics and race serve as independent variables.  The independent 
variable for non-white player is assigned a value of 1 for non-white players (black and 
Latino players) and a 0 for white players.   
IV. Regression Equations and Hypotheses 
A. Baseball Non-Pitchers 
 Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics for baseball non-pitchers.  As 
illustrated, non-white players only account for 33.5% of the total number of hitters. The 
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average prices for non-pitcher baseball cards are $0.84 for white players and $0.89 for 
non-white players.  We specified the following model for non-pitchers: 
 
AVERAGEOFFENSIVEBASESSTOLEN
AVERAGEBATWHITENONP pitchersnon
43
210
)()(
)((?)
ββ
βββ
++
++
+−+=
+
−   (1) 
 
where OFFENSIVE AVERAGE = 
WalksBatsAt
BasesStolenWalksHitsonBaseGainedBasesTotal
+
++ )( , similar to Andersen and La 
Croix (1991). Expected signs on the coefficients are shown in parentheses. As long as the 
race variables are uncorrelated with omitted variables that measure athletic ability, the 
estimated coefficient on race will be an unbiased estimator of consumer discrimination. 
 Before settling on the regression model above, more traditional methods of 
measuring a player’s performance were incorporated into the model, including hits, 
games, at-bats, and the remaining variables listed in the descriptive statistics (Table I).  
However, many of these disaggregated variables are eliminated based on their high 
correlation to each other.  For example, “hits” takes into account the number of doubles, 
triples, and homeruns that a player gets.  Additionally, the statistics “runs-batted-in” and 
“runs scored” are omitted because of their close relationship to hits.  The more hits a 
player has, the more times they have the opportunity to score and the more teammates 
they help reach home plate.  Because of the complex network of correlated variables, a 
new variable is sought to better account for a player’s productivity.  The variable 
“offensive average” is borrowed from Anderson and La Croix (1991) who borrowed the 
concept from Bennett and Flueck (1983). 
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B.  Baseball Pitchers 
 Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics for baseball pitchers.  Once again, 
non-white players are also a league minority, only making up 9.2% of all pitchers in 
MLB.  The average prices for pitcher baseball cards are $0.68 for white players and $0.52 
for non-white players. We specified the following model for pitchers: 
RATIOPITCHINGUPGIVENRUNS
UPGIVENHITSPITCHEDINNINGS
SAVESWINSWHITENONPpitchers
76
54
3210
)()(
)((?)
)()((?)
ββ
ββ
ββββ
++
+−
++
−
++−+=
++
 (2) 
 
where PITCHING RATIO = 
WALKS
OUTSSTRIKE , similar to Andersen and La Croix (1991). 
Many of the variables excluded from this regression may provoke some controversy, 
particularly earned run average, or ERA.  In order to understand the reason behind its 
omission, it is important to know how a pitcher’s ERA is derived.  The Official 
Homepage of Major League Baseball defines ERA as “the total number of earned runs 
allowed by a pitcher, divided by his total innings pitched, multiplied by nine.”  The flaw 
with using this variable as a means of measuring a pitcher’s performance is that there are 
three distinct types of pitchers that serve three different functions: starters, relievers, and 
closers.  In general, a starting pitcher begins the game and pitches until he is no longer 
effective in preventing the other team from getting on base and scoring.  A reliever 
replaces a starting pitcher if the other team is earning runs against the starter.  This can 
occur toward the beginning or end of the game.   A closer is only used at the end of the 
game as a means of ensuring that the other team does not gain any more runs.  
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Accordingly, a pitcher’s ERA often reflects his role as a starter, reliever, or closer.  A 
starter’s ERA, for example, varies less than a closer’s ERA because of the number of 
innings pitched.  Because a closer pitches far less innings than a starter, any runs scored 
in the last innings drastically increases a closer’s ERA.  As a result, a closing pitcher 
generally has a higher ERA than a starter.  Likewise, the ERA of a reliever depends on 
how often and when they get into the game.  Therefore, instead of using ERA we use 
PITCHING RATIO. Using pitching ratio in conjunction with wins, saves, innings pitched, 
hits, runs, accounts for relevant statistics for each type of pitcher.   
C.  Basketball 
 Table 3 summarizes the descriptive statistics for basketball players.  In contrast to 
the baseball statistics, non-white players are a league majority in professional basketball.  
Non-white players represent approximately 70.7% of the entire NBA.  The average prices 
for basketball cards are $5.72 for white players and $4.51 for non-white players.  We 
specified the following model for basketball players: 
GAMEPERPOINTSAVERAGEASSISTS
FOULSPERSONALREBOUNDSWHITENONPbasketball
54
3210
)()(
(?))((?)
ββ
ββββ
++
++
++−+=
+
 (3) 
 Unlike baseball, where there are two distinct aspects of the game, pitching and 
hitting, basketball players must perform offensively and defensively.  This allows for a 
much simpler analysis of each player’s overall performance.  Of the many disaggregated 
variables listed in the descriptive statistics, all of them can be accounted for using 
average points per game, rebounds, personal fouls, and assists.  Free throws and field 
goals are both explained using the “points” variable.  Moreover, points and games are 
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used to calculate average points per game.  “Minutes” is also eliminated as it is highly 
correlated to games.  The more games a player appears in, the more minutes he has on the 
court. 
V. Results 
A. Baseball Non-Pitchers 
The baseball non-pitcher sample consists of 346 non-pitchers: 230 white players 
and 116 non-white players. Equation (1) was estimated using Tobit regressions for linear 
and log prices, reported in Table 4. For non-pitchers, the coefficients on batting average, 
stolen bases, and offensive average are all positive, as expected, and significant. More 
importantly, the coefficient on non-white is negative with a t-ratio of –3.54 in the linear 
model and –3.00 in the log model.  
B. Baseball Pitchers  
The baseball pitcher sample consists of 238 pitchers: 216 white players and 22 
non-white players. Equation (2) was estimated using Tobit regressions for linear and log 
prices, reported in Table 5. Using the linear model for pitchers, the coefficients on wins, 
saves, and the pitching ratio are not significant. The insignificant impact of wins and 
saves on the price of a pitcher’s card is also found in Andersen and La Croix (1991) 
depending on the model. However, the most surprising of these results is the pitching 
ratio. In the linear model, the coefficient on innings pitched is positive and significant, as 
is the coefficient on runs given up, contradicting the hypothesis. As predicted, the 
coefficient on hits given up is negative and significant. More importantly in the linear 
model, the coefficient on non-white is negative with a t-ratio of –2.95. 
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Using the log model for pitchers, the coefficients on innings pitched and runs 
given up are not significant. The coefficient on wins, saves, and pitching ratio are 
positive and significant as expected. Also as predicted, the coefficient on hits given up is 
negative and significant. More importantly in the linear model, the coefficient on non-
white is negative with a t-ratio of –1.73. 
 C. Basketball 
The basketball sample consists of 133 players: 39 white players and 94 non-white 
players. Equation (3) was estimated using Tobit regressions for linear and log prices, 
reported in Table 6. In the linear model, the coefficients on rebounds, assists, and average 
points per game are all positive and significant, as expected. The coefficient on personal 
fouls is not significant. More importantly, the coefficient on non-white is negative with a 
t-ratio of –2.17.  
In the log model, the coefficients on rebounds and average points per game are 
positive and significant, as expected. The coefficient on personal fouls and assists are not 
significant. Again, the coefficient on non-white is negative with a t-ratio of -1.06. 
VI. Conclusions 
 Racial minority has a significant impact on the value of a professional sports card.  
Consumers discriminate more against racial minorities rather than league minorities.  
Accordingly, this paper supports the findings of Nardinelli and Simon (1990) and 
Anderson and La Croix (1991) and finds results that differ from the findings in Stone and 
Warren (1999). Thus, professional sports cards depicting racial minorities sell for 
significantly less than racial majorities of equal ability.  
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of Non-Pitcher Baseball Card 
Prices by Race
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Figure 2. Distribution of Pitcher Baseball Card Prices by 
Race
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Figure 3. Distribution of Basketball Card Prices by Race
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Baseball Non-Pitchers 
 
 
Variables     Observations Mean  Minimum Maximum 
Price    346  0.86  0.30    30 
Non-white   346        0.34  0  1 
Batting Average            346  0.26  0.18  0.33 
Games              346  1310.15 42         3562 
At-Bats             346    4250.82 67        14053 
Runs              346     544.95          6         2165 
Hits              346  1131.82         14  4256 
Doubles             346  186.81          1            746 
Triples              346  29.90          0  141 
Homeruns             346    105.61          0           563 
Runs-Batted-In            346     521.99          3       1844 
Walks              346     427.99          7        1865 
Strike Outs             346     598.39          9          2597 
On-Base %             346       0.32       0.23         0.40 
Slugging %             346  0.48      1.86           35 
Stolen Bases             346  81.32          0   938 
Offensive Average*     346  0.45       0.29  0.89 
 
 
           Total Bases Gained on Base Hits + Walks + Stolen Bases 
* Offensive Average =                                  At Bats + Walks 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Baseball Pitchers 
 
 
Variables     Observations Mean        Minimum Maximum 
Price    238        0.67        0.30           20 
Non-white   238  0.09          0  1 
 
ERA              238       3.75       2.83        5.85 
 
Wins              238     84.60          1             329 
 
Losses              238  79.88          3          292 
 
Saves              238   30.72          0  390 
 
Games Pitched            238    367.21          13         1071 
 
Innings Pitched            238  1461.60      46.2         5404 
 
Hits Given Up             238  1404.20        58         5044 
 
Runs Given In             238    655.58         29         2337 
 
Errors              238    581.47         28         2012 
 
Bases-On-Balls            238    498.90         20         2795 
 
Strike Outs (Ks)            238    862.72           20         5714 
 
Pitching Ratio*            238      1.58          0.84          3.25 
 
Average Against            238       0.26       0.20         0.33 
 
 
 
     Strike Outs 
* Pitching Ratio =           Walks 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Basketball Players 
 
 
Variables     Observations Mean          Minimum Maximum 
 
Price    133     5.05        1.75           60 
 
Non-white            133  0.71          0  1 
 
Games              133   733.69         134  1560 
 
Minutes             133            21828.11 1493  57446 
 
Field Goals             133  4326.74       269  15837 
 
Free Throws             133  2195.34        71        9018 
 
Rebounds             133  4344.88       215        17834 
 
Assists              133  2257.69 99         6476 
 
Personal Fouls            133  2055.80       192         4657 
 
Points              133  10876.36 609  38387  
 
Average PPG             133  14.00         4.2         25.1 
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Table 4. Tobit Regressions for Baseball Non-Pitchers, N = 346 
                      
    Linear  Price    Log Price    
Variable   Coefficient   Coefficient   
(t-stat)    (t-stat)  
 
     
Non-white   -0.76    -0.82  
    (-3.54***)   (-3.00***) 
 
Batting Average  13.33    35.17       
    (2.80***)   (4.59***) 
 
Stolen Bases           0.00    0.00 
    (3.07***)   (2.12**) 
 
Offensive Average  6.37    12.97 
    (3.73***)   (5.24***) 
 
Constant   -5.37    -16.63 
    (-5.04***)   (-5.89***) 
 
Log-Likelihood  -670.75   -104.52 
Function 
 
 
KEY: 
* = Significance level of 10% or better 
** = Significance level of 5% or better 
*** = Significance level of 1% or better 
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Table 5. Tobit Regressions for Baseball Pitchers, N = 238  
 
    Linear Price   Log Price 
Variable   Coefficient   Coefficient  
(t-stat)    (t-stat) 
 
Non-white   -0.92          -0.79 
               (-2.95***)   (-1.73*) 
 
Wins             0.00    0.02 
            (0.25)    (1.80*) 
    
Saves              0.00    0.00 
    (0.30)    (2.05**) 
 
Innings Pitched                   0.01    0.00 
    (7.72***)   (0.99) 
 
Hits Given Up                    -0.01    -0.00 
    (-13.39***)   (-3.70***) 
 
Runs Given Up                   0.01    -0.00        
    (3.23***)   (-0.09) 
 
Pitching Ratio                  -0.23    0.50       
             (-0.75)    (1.84*) 
 
Constant                   0.37    -2.51 
    (0.87)    (-3.76***) 
 
Log-Likelihood  -409.60   -26.47 
Function 
 
 
 
KEY: 
* = Significance level of 10% or better 
** = Significance level of 5% or better 
*** = Significance level of 1% or better 
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Table 6. Tobit Regressions for Basketball Players, N = 133  
 
    Linear Price   Log Price 
Variables   Coefficient   Coefficient  
(t-stat)    (t-stat) 
 
Non-white          -3.69          -1.06 
               (-2.17**)   (-2.98***) 
 
Rebounds                    0.01    0.00     
    (2.70***)   (1.87*) 
 
Personal Fouls                 -0.00    -0.00        
    (-1.47)    (-0.65) 
 
Assists                     0.00    0.00     
(2.12**)   (0.42) 
 
Average PPG                    1.20    0.17 
    (5.90***)   (3.85***) 
 
Constant                 -15.14    -1.62       
    (-4.61***)   (-1.82*) 
 
Log-Likelihood  -333.60   -50.72 
Function 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KEY: 
* = Significance level of 10% or better 
** = Significance level of 5% or better 
*** = Significance level of 1% or better 
    
 
 
 
 
 
